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Returns to Compulsory Schooling in Britain: Evidence from 
a Bayesian Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
 
In this paper we reevaluate the returns to education based on the increase in the compulsory 
schooling age from 14 to 15 in the UK in 1947. We provide a Bayesian fuzzy regression 
discontinuity approach to infer the effect on earnings for a subset of subjects who turned 14 
in a narrow window around the policy change and whose schooling was affected by the 
policy change. Our approach and our results are quite different from previous work that has 
focused on large sets of cohorts and 2SLS based approaches and has reported positive 
earnings and wage effects of 5% and above. Our empirical analysis, using data from the UK 
General Household Surveys, yields considerably lower earnings and wage effects for the 
additional year of compulsory schooling than previous work. These findings are consistent 
with the implementation of the policy change that affected students at the lower end of the 
schooling distribution and did not lead students to acquire additional qualifications. The 
results add further evidence to a number of recent studies that have found no effect from this 
policy change on socio-economic outcomes correlated with earnings. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C11, C21, I21 
  
Keywords:  Bayesian inference, causal effects, imperfect compliance, natural experiment, 






Department of Economics 
University of Melbourne 
5th floor Economics and Commerce Building 
Victoria 3010 
Australia 
E-mail: ljacobi@unimelb.edu.au   
 1 Introduction
Changes in compulsory schooling laws have provided an important backdrop for understand-
ing the returns to education (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Kane and Rouse, 1995; Harmon and
Walker, 1995, 1999; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001). One empirical ﬁnding from such natural
experiments is that the labor market effects of education appear to be lower in Europe com-
pared to those in the US (Devereux and Hart, 2010; Pischke and von Wachter, 2008; Meghir
and Paelme, 2005). An experiment that has attracted considerable attention in the recent liter-
ature is the increase in the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the UK in April 1947.
Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006), Oreopoulos (2008) and Devereux and Hart
(2010) have exploited the regression discontinuity in the schooling intake that resulted from
the change in the compulsory schooling policy to estimate the returns to schooling based on
2SLS methods. The ﬁrst two of these studies report returns to schooling of well above 10%,
while the latter two report estimates of around 5%.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach for ﬁnding the returns to education from
the 1947 policy change. We provide a ﬂexible Bayesian inferential framework based on the
fuzzy regression discontinuity approach (Trochim, 1984; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) to infer
the effect on earnings for a subset of subjects who turned 14 in a narrow window around
the policy change and whose schooling was affected by the policy change. The fuzzy RD
perspective is required because compliance with the new policy was imperfect. Our approach
is motivated by the speciﬁc features of the 1947 policy change that was implemented within
a tripartite secondary school system with streaming of students based on an ability test at age
11. The increase in the school leaving minimum age thus affected students at the lower end of
the education distribution (leaving before age 16) enrolled in non-academic types of secondary
schools (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2007; Lindeboom et al., 2009). We therefore deﬁne the
educational attainment variable as binary that takes the value of 1 if a student leaves school at
age 15, and 0 if the subject leaves school at 14 and focus our attention on subjects who had
turned 14 near the time of the policy change. We take the observation window to run from
21946 to 1948. This also improves control for omitted variables that change smoothly over time
and ensures that the control and treated subjects had faced a comparable set of circumstances.
Within this setup, we calculate the effect of an additional year of schooling, leaving school
at age 15 rather than at age 14, on later earnings, for subjects that complied with the policy
change.
Our analysis yields very little evidence for any positive returns to eduction from the ad-
ditional year of compulsory schooling, with earnings effects estimates for compliers around
1.6% and wage effects estimates around -0.3%. The ﬁndings appear reasonable in the context
of the secondary school system in place at the time with the extra year imposed on subjects at
the low end of the schooling distribution and not leading to any special or additional qualiﬁca-
tions or certiﬁcates. While our estimates are below those reported in Oreopoulos (2008) and
Devereux and Hart (2010), they are consistent with the ﬁndings from a recent paper by Grenet
(2009). The paper provides empirical evidence based on two different schooling reforms in
France and England that a positive earnings effect of compulsory schooling emerge when
there is an increase in the qualiﬁcations obtained by students. Further, our results are also in
accordance with a number of studies into the effect of the increase in compulsory schooling
on other outcomes such as children’s health outcomes and mortality (Lindeboom et al., 2009;
Clark and Royer, 2007; Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2007) that have also found very little
evidence for any effects of the 1947 reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more information about
the effects of the compulsory schooling policy change and the schooling system. Section 3
introduces the identiﬁcation strategy to isolate the returns to schooling based on the fuzzy
RD approach, the ﬂexible parametric framework for earnings and schooling and the Bayesian
inferential framework to estimate the returns to schooling. In Section 4 we discuss the data
and the construction of the sample for the RD analysis. The empirical results are presented in
Section 5 and conclusions are given in Section 6.
32 Background
The increase in the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 in April 1947 was part of
the 1944 Education Act that reorganized the secondary school system with the aim to make
secondary education available to all students. The Education act introduced free secondary
education for all students and a tripartite system with grammar schools, secondary modern
schools and technical schools. Admission to the academically oriented grammar schools was
based on a test administered at age 11. Students not admitted to a grammar school attended
a secondary modern school with a small portion transferring to a technical school at ages 12
or 13 (Halsey and Ridge, 1980). These schools provided lower level academic education,
including for those students leaving school at the minimum school leaving age (Lindeboom
et al., 2009).
Introduced in this setting, the 1947 increase in the school leaving minimum age resulted
mainly in an immediate increase in the proportion of students that stayed an extra year in non-
academic type of secondary schools (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2007). Figure 1 shows
the school leaving behavior of cohorts of students turning 14 between 1932 and 1965. Graph
(a), based on subjects in the UK General Household surveys, shows the proportion of students
in a cohort that left school at age 14, 15 or beyond. The solid vertical line in 1947 refers to
the increase in the school leaving age and the dashed line to the introduction of the tripartite
schooling system and access to free secondary education. We observe a jump in the proportion
of students leaving school at age 15 from the 1946 to 1948 cohorts of 14 year old subjects, that
is mirrored by a sharp decline in the proportion of students leaving at age 14. For example,
in the cohort of students who turned 14 in 1946, over 50% dropped out of school at age 14,
and only around 15% at age 15. In comparison, over 50% of the students that were 14 in
1948 dropped out at age 15, while roughly 10% dropped out at age 14. In contrast, the graph
indicates a smooth trend for the proportion of subjects leaving school after the age of 15.
At the time of the policy change students could take two external examinations, the school
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Figure 1: Schooling and qualiﬁcations of students leaving school at age 14, age 15 and beyond age 15
in the 1935 to 1965 cohorts.
students at age 16 and age 18 and replaced by the general certiﬁcate for education (0-level,A-
level) in 1951. Students completing the full course (4 years before the policy change and
5 years afterwards) could obtain a school leaving certiﬁcate. However, secondary modern
students often left school at the earliest possible moment without taking a school certiﬁcate
(Halsey and Ridge, 1980). Thus it is not surprising that the increase in the school leaving
minimum age which affected students at the low end of the schooling distribution did not lead
to an increase in qualiﬁcations. This is conﬁrmed by the graph in panel (b) in Figure 1 which
shows that the proportion of students without any qualiﬁcations declined smoothly over time,
showing no discontinuity around the policy change.
3 Framework
Our aim is to identify the effect of an additional year of schooling, for those leaving school at
age 15 rather than at age 14, on later earnings by exploiting the change in the schooling intake
of students induced by the policy change. In this section we set up a Bayesian framework to
estimatetheeffectofstayinginsecondaryschoolforoneadditionalyear, focussingonstudents
who turned 14 in the window between 1946 and 1948. Let T be a continuous variable that
represents the year and quarter a student turned 14 in the window between 1946 and 1948
5and let ¿ denote the 2nd quarter of 1947 when the new policy was introduced. Further, deﬁne
z¤ = (T ¡¿) as the distance measured in quarters between when a student turned 14 and when
the new policy was introduced. The indicator variable z = I[z¤ > 0] assigns a subject in the
window to a policy regime. It is one if a student who turned 14 faced the new policy and 0 if
a student who turned 14 faced the old policy. Speciﬁcally,
z =
½
1 if min schooling leaving age is 15 when subject turned 14
0 if min schooling leaving age is 14 when subject turned 14




1 if subject dropped out of school at age 15
0 if subject dropped out of school at age 14 :
As discussed in the introduction, the policy change altered the probability distribution of
x around the time of the change in policy. If we let z¤ = 0+ denote the value of z¤ just to the
right of ¿ and z¤ = 0¡ denote the value of z¤ to the left of ¿, then we observe a discontinuity
in the probability distribution of x around the threshold, ie.,
Pr(x = 1jz
¤ = 0
+) 6= Pr(x = 1jz
¤ = 0
¡) (3.1)
as shown in panel (a) in Figure 1. The graph also shows that not all students, however, com-
plied with the policy change. In particular, some students under the old policy regime left
school at age 15, while some students under the new policy regime left school at age 14.
In such a fuzzy RD design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), where Pr(x = 1jz¤ = 0¡) < 1,
we suppose that x is determined by z and an additional unobserved variable that is corre-
lated with earnings. Borrowing from the statistical literature on principal stratiﬁcation and the
econometrics literature on LATE (Sommer and Zeger, 1991; Imbens and Angrist, 1994), we
model this unobserved confounder as an exogenous discrete variable that reﬂects compliance
behavior and is deﬁned as follows: compliers (C) for subjects who comply with the policy
in place, always drop-out 14 (AD14) for subjects who always leave school at age 14 regard-
less of the policy in place, and always drop-out 15 (AD15) for subjects who always leave at
age 15 regardless of the policy in place. In what follows, subject type is denoted by s = k,
6where k = fC;AD14;AD15g. The unknown probabilities of subject types are denoted by
Pr(s = k) = pk.






0 if z = 0 and s = AD14 or s = c
0 if z = 1 and s = AD14
1 if z = 0 and s = AD15
1 if z = 1 and s = AD15 or s = C
Itfollowsdirectlythatcompliersareobservedunderthetwodifferentschoolinglevels, whereas
subjects of the other two types are only ever observed under one schooling level. It is easily
seen that the discontinuity in expression (3.1) holds if some subjects comply with the pol-
icy change. By simple calculation it follows that Pr(x = 1jz¤ = 0+) = qAD15 + qC and
Pr(x = 1jz¤ = 0¡) = qAD15. Thus, condition (3.1) holds if qC > 0.
The type deﬁnition also implies that a subject’s observed schooling intake given the min-
imum school leaving policy in place provides information about the subject’s type, although
type is not known for all subjects. As shown in Table 1, those who leave school at age 15
Schooling Intake
Policy Indicator x = 0 (leave age 14) x = 1 (leave age 15)
z = 0 (old policy) C, AD14 AD15
z = 1 (new policy) AD14 C, AD15
Table 1: Distribution of a subject’s type by observed policy regime and schooling intake
under the old policy regime are always drop-out 14 and those who leave at age 14 under the
new policy regime are always drop-out 15. Both types also appear in a diagonal cell where we
also observe compliers.
Now let fy0;C;y0;AD14;y1;C;y1;AD15g be the four potential outcomes that refer to the earn-
ings of a subject of a given type under the possible schooling levels. Also let w denote any
observed control variables that affect the distribution of these potential outcomes. Then, under
the condition that y0;C and y1;C are smooth functions around the threshold ¿, it can be shown
7that the average treatment effect for compliers, with T close to T ¤, is identiﬁed and given by
E[y1;C ¡ y0;Cjw;s = c] =
E[yjw;z¤ = 0+] ¡ E[yjw;z¤ = 0¡]
Pr(x = 1jz¤ = 0+) ¡ Pr(x = 1jz¤ = 0¡)
(3.2)
In the next Section we specify a parametric framework to estimate this effect.
3.1 Parametric Speciﬁcation
Our approach is to estimate the Complier Average Earnings Effect from equation (3.2) in a
Bayesian parametric RD framework of ﬂexible log earnings models from a sample of males.
For each subject i in the sample, let yi denote the subject’s observed log earnings. Following
the approach in Chib and Jacobi (2008) we model the observed earnings and schooling intake
in terms of the potential earnings models pj(yijzi = l;si = k) and the type probability Pr(si =
k) as
p(yi;xi = jjzi = l) =
X
k2Klj
Pr(si = k) pj(yijzi = l;si = k) ; j = 0;1; l = 0;1
where si is the subject’s type and Klj the set of possible values that si can take given the
observed values of the schooling and policy indicators. From the previous discussion (Table
1) if follows that K00 = fC;AD14g, K01 = fAD15g, K10 = fAD14g, K11 = fC;AD15g.
To allow for outliers common in earnings data we allow for student-t errors in the log
earnings models rather than using the standard but more restrictive normality assumption. We
formulate two linear regression models for the potential earnings of compliers under the two
different schooling intakes, and one model each for always drop-outs 14 under xi = 0 and
always drop-outs 15 under xi = 1:




j;C) ; j = 0;1










where vector wi refers to a set of control variables and º to the degrees of freedom of the
student-t distribution.
8We note that in this model speciﬁcation the effect of schooling on earnings is modeled
ﬂexibly through an effect on the intercept as well as the slope coefﬁcients and the variances.
Thecausaleffectofinterestistheaveragecausalearningseffectforasubjectwhoisacomplier
and is given by
E[y1Cjs = C;w] ¡ E[y0Cjs = C;w] = w
0¯1;C ¡ w
0¯0;C (3.4)
Under the assumptions of the model, this effect is identiﬁed.
3.2 Estimation and Model Comparison
Our parametric assumptions from the previous section lead to a likelihood of the observed
earnings and schooling intake vectors, y = fy1;:::;yng and x = fx1;:::;xng, given the ob-
served assignments and covariate vectors z = fz1;:::;zng and W = fw1;:::;wng, that takes














































AD15) and p = fpC;pAD14;pAD15g and Ilj refers to the set of subjects
with zi = l and xi = j.
Here we proceed under the Bayesian inferential approach to estimate the model parameters
and the complier average treatment effect. The posterior distribution of the model parameters
is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior. We assume ﬂexible proper prior










9where K0 = fC;AD14g and K1 = fC;AD15g. The prior parameters are speciﬁed with the
help of an additional sample of male cohorts from the 1979 to 1998 UKGHS surveys just
outside the 1946-1948 window, those turning 14 either in the 1944-45 period or the 1949-
1950 period. For a sensitivity check we repeat the empirical analysis under alternative prior
assumptions.
To simulate the posterior distribution by efﬁcient Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods we include the unobserved compliance type indicators into the parameter space, but
not the unobserved counterfactuals, following Chib (2007). From the previous discussion it
follows that for subjects with (xi = zi = 0) the type variable can take the value of either
complier or always drop-out 14, while subjects with (xi = zi = 1) can be either compliers or
always drop-out 15. We deﬁne the vectors s00 = fsi : xi = zi = 0g and s11 = fsi : xi =
zi = 1g, where si = 1 denotes that the subject is a complier. The posterior distribution of the
parameters is then simulated by MCMC methods as proposed in Chib and Jacobi (2008) and
described in detail in the appendix.
We estimate the complier average treatment effect by calculating the posterior distribution
of w0¯1;C¡w0¯0;C from the sampled draws of the parameters from our MCMC procedure. At
each MCMC iteration, we compute and store the average difference in the potential earnings
for all subjects who are classiﬁed as compliers.
In our empirical analysis we consider a range of speciﬁcations with different covariate
vectors and different degrees of freedom. We use the model marginal likelihood to pick the
model that best ﬁts the data. The marginal likelihood of each model is estimated via the Chib





where µ¤ refers to the vector of the posterior means of the parameters. The likelihood and the
prior ordinate are calculated directly and the posterior ordinate is estimated using the output
of the full and reduced MCMC runs of the MCMC algorithm (see the appendix for details).
104 Data
The data for our analysis comes from the UK General Household Surveys (UKGHS) which is
a panel of cross-section surveys. The UKGHS is a continuous survey that has been carried out
by the Social Survey Division of the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) since 1971 to collect
information on a range of topics from people living in private households in Great Britain.
Following Devereux and Hart (2010) we exclude the pre-1979 surveys to avoid problems due
to a different reporting scheme of earnings in the early surveys. The collected data includes
information on birth-dates, education, income and employment.
A. Construction of Sample and Key Variables
Following our previous discussion, we focus on subjects from the 1979 to 1998 surveys
that turned 14 between 1946 and 1948, e.g. born between 1932 and 1934. The 1986 to 1995
and 1998 surveys report both birth year and birth months for each respondent and we simply
assign a value of zero to zi for subjects who turned 14 between January 1946 and March 1947
(born between January 1932 and March 1933), and a value of one for subjects who turned
14 between April 1947 and December 1948 (born between April 1933 and December 1934).
Subjects in the 1986 to 1995 surveys and the 1998 survey that turned 14 before 1946 and after
1948 are excluded. For subjects in the remaining surveys information on birth year and month
are not available. We utilize the reported age together with the survey year and month and
construct a one year interval for when the subject turned 14. If the upper bound of this interval
is at or below March 1947, then the policy regime indicator of the subject is set at zero. If the
lower bound of the interval is at or above April 1947, the subject is assigned the value one for
the policy indicator. Subjects for whom the interval includes April 1947 are dropped from the
sample as we are not able to determine the policy regime from the available data. Subjects
outside the window, those with the upper bound of the interval below January 1946, and those
with the lower bound above December 1948 are also excluded.
To deﬁne the binary schooling intake variable xi for each subject we again follow previous
11work and use information on the reported age when a subject left school. We assign a value
of zero to the schooling intake if a subject reported leaving school at age 14, and a value of
one if the subject reported leaving school at age 15. We exclude subjects from the sample that
reported a school leaving age above 15 and also the few subjects that reported leaving before
age 14. We further exclude the few subjects who report an age above the school leaving age
for when they left full-time education.
For the deﬁnition of the earnings variable yi we follow Devereux and Hart (2010) and
construct a variable for real log weekly earnings based on the reported gross weekly earnings
(including earnings from self employment), deﬂated by the UK retail price index with base
year 1998. We also construct a hourly wage variable based on the weekly earnings and the
reported work hours. We exclude subjects from the pre-1979 surveys due to different earnings
measures based on the year prior to the survey, rather than the earnings based on the week
before the survey. Further, to avoid retirement related issues, we omit subjects age 60 and
older. As shown in Banks and Blundell (2005) many low-skilled men quit working before
the age of 65 in this time period, leading to an employment rate of low-skilled men age 60-
64 of about 40%. Following Devereux and Hart (2010) we also drop subjects whose weekly
working hours is missing or above 84 hours.
B. Sample Features
Restricting our attention to males we obtain a sample of 1,935 subjects. Of these, 987
turn 14 under the old policy regime with 807 subjects leaving school at age 14 and 180 at age
15. From the 848 subjects that turned 14 under the new school leaving minimum age of 15,
163 subjects dropped out at age 14 and the remaining 787 at age 15. Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics for the sample. The subjects are between the ages of 44 and 59 and come
from the 1979 to 1994 surveys.
Given our focus on subjects within a narrow window of the policy change, a respondent’s
age and the survey year when earning are reported are highly correlated. By construction, we
only observe subjects from three different cohorts in each survey year with subjects under the
12Summary Statistics for Male Sample
Variable
Description [short] Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Leaving School at Age 15 [x] 0.50 0 1
Under new Policy [z] 0.49 0 1
Age [age] 52.22 4.17 44 59
Married [married] 0.59 0 1
survey year* [year] 85.35 4.05 79 94
Log Weekly Earnings** [learn] 5.54 0.51 1.87 7.56
Log hourly Wage** [lwage] 1.85 0.49 0.03 3.56
work hours 41.41 9.10 3 81
Table 2: *Calender Years are reported as (year - 1900).** Real earnings in 1998 pounds.
new policy being slightly younger. The average age of subjects with x = 1 is 51, which is 1.5
year lower than that of subjects with x = 0. Hence we can only include controls for either
age or survey year in our earnings models, and not controls for both as it is commonly done in
the empirical literature. Since the subjects in our sample are mature employees of age 44 (and
holding mainly blue collar jobs) we would expect a ﬂat earnings proﬁle and include controls
for survey year. As earnings are observed over a 16 year time period from 1979 to 1994, we
would expect a strong time effects so we include controls for survey year. The graphs for time
and age trends in the general UKGHS sample of males from the 1935 to 1965 in Figure 2
provide support for these covariate adjustments. We observe strong systematic upward trends
in the earnings, but only a weak negative age trend in earnings. The same is true for log wages.
Since in a given survey year subjects that comply with the minimum school leaving age and
leave school at age 15 (under the new policy) are younger than those leaving school with
age 14 (under the old policy), we cannot rule out a small upward bias in our earning effects
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Figure 2: Average weekly earnings for males leaving school age 14 and 15 for age 50 in different
survey years (a), and average earning by age in the 1980 survey (b) for males in 1935 to 1965 cohorts.
5 Results
In this section we present the results from the analysis of earnings for the sample of males
from the 1946 to 1948 cohorts described in the previous section. Following previous work
we implement the analysis for both log weekly earnings and log hourly wages. We consider
two different speciﬁcations for the covariate vector in the earnings model, one with a control
for survey year (S1) and one with an additional control for marital status (S2). The former
is comparable to previous work although we need to exclude age as discussed in Section 4.
Instead of proceeding with the analysis by setting the degrees of freedom for the student-t log
earnings distributions at one particular level, we ﬁt the models under a range of values for
the degrees of freedom and as well under the Normality assumption. The models are then
compared based on their (log) marginal likelihoods.
The upper panel in Table 3 gives the log marginal likelihoods for the various model ﬁt
with the two dependent variables, log weekly earnings and log hourly wages, respectively.
According to the marginal likelihood criterion, the data exhibit thick tails as the models with
the lowest degrees of freedom are preferred.
In the lower panel of Table 3 we present the estimates of the parameters for the earnings
14Model Comparison and Model Parameter Estimates
Log Marginal Likelihoods
dof /spec. 5/1 5/2 10/1 10/2 20/1 20/1 1/1 1/2
Earn -2004.42 -1990.96* -2031.60 -2018.39 -2044.12 -2030.96 -2061.49 -2052.38
Wage -2066.26 -2056.06* -2074.33 -2064.80 -2083.75 -2075.16 -2091.78 -2085.09
Posterior Means (Stdv) for Earnings Model (5/2)
C (x = 0) C(x = 1) AD14 AD15
¯ 4.390 (0.464) 4.929 (0.471) 6.133 (0.848) 5.424 (0.913)
0.013 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) -0.008 (0.010) 0.002 (0.011)
0.140 (0.045) 0.120 (0.049) 0.167 (.077) 0.159 (0.084)
¾2 0.094 (0.010) 0.115 (0.019) 0.106 (0.010) 0.143 (0.019)
pk 0.644 (0.017) 0.173 (0.012) 0.183 (0.012)
Table3: Estimatedlogmarginallikelihoodsforvariousdegreesoffreedomandcovariatespeciﬁcations
(* Model preferred based on marginal likelihood criterion) and model parameter estimates for preferred
earnings model. Results are based on the draws from the MCMC sampler with 10,000 iterations and
1000 burn-in iterations.
models deﬁned in equation (3.3) for the preferred model that has student-t errors, 5 degrees of
freedom and covariate speciﬁcation 2. Columns (2) and (3) provide the means and standard
deviations for the parameters in the earnings models for compliers leaving school at ages
14 and 15. We observe small differences in the posterior means of the intercept and slope
coefﬁcients. In comparison, we observe larger differences in the coefﬁcient estimates between
compliers and the AD14 and AD15 subjects. The estimated type probabilities are 0.64 for
compliers and 0.17 and 0.18 for AD14 and AD15, respectively.
To evaluate the causal effect of an extra year of schooling for compliers we estimate the
complier average causal earnings and wage effects. Figure 3 shows the kernel-smoothed
graphs of the posterior densities of the complier average returns to schooling for log weekly
earnings in Panel (a) and hourly wages in Panel (b) for the model speciﬁcations with the high-
est marginal likelihoods. For log weekly earnings the densities are centered slightly to the
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(b) Log Hourly Wages
Figure 3: Kernel-smoothed densities of the posterior density of CATE for speciﬁcations 1 and 2 under
5 degrees of freedom for earnings and wages.
right of zero while that those for hourly wages are centered slightly to the left of zero.
The estimates of the returns to schooling in terms of the posterior means of the CATE
are presented in the upper part of Table 4. For the winning speciﬁcation with 5 degrees of
freedom the average returns to schooling for compliers is 1.6% in terms of earnings and -0.3%
for hourly wages. Across the various speciﬁcations the estimates for the complier average
Estimates of Average Returns to Schooling
CATE: Mean and Stand.Dev.
D.o.F 5 10 20 1
Earnings S1 0.015 (0.026) 0.008 (0.025) 0.015 (0.023) 0.019 (0.022)
S2 0.016 (0.027) 0.010 (0.025) 0.017 (0.023) 0.019 (0.022)
Wages S1 -0.005 (0.028) 0.003 (0.030) -0.009 (0.029) 0.001 (0.027)
S2 -0.003 (0.028) 0.000 (0.030) -0.008 (0.028) 0.002 (0.026)
Table 4: Posterior means and standard deviations for complier average treatment effect based on the
ﬁttings of the various model speciﬁcations.
earnings effects vary between 0.8% and 1.9% and the complier average wage effects between
-0.9% and 0.3%. Overall these estimates point to very small positive returns to schooling in
terms of earnings and even smaller and slightly negative effects for wages. To further explore
16the robustness of the ﬁndings we have redone the above analysis using a set of uninformed
priors. The results (see Appendix) conﬁrm the conclusions from our main analysis.
Insummary, ouranalysissuggestsreturnstoschoolingfromtheincreaseinthecompulsory
school leaving age from 14 to 15 in the UK in 1947 below those reported in Oreopoulos
(2008) and Devereux and Hart (2010). However, these low estimates are to be expected given
the secondary education system at the time of the raise in school leaving minimum age that is
exploitedheretoestimatetheearningsandwageeffectsofanadditionalyearofeducation. The
1947 increase in the school leaving minimum age resulted mainly in an immediate increase
in the proportion of students that stayed an extra year in non-academic type of secondary
schools (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2007) and did not raise the level of qualiﬁcations held
by students.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we reevaluate the returns to education based on the increase in the compulsory
schoolingagefrom14to15intheUKin1947. Ourapproachandourresultsarequitedifferent
from previous work that has focused on large sets of cohorts and 2SLS based approaches
and has reported positive earnings and wage effects of 5% and above. Our estimates point
to at most small earnings effects of 1.5% and below and suggest no positive wage effects
from the additional year of schooling resulting from the policy change. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the implementation of the policy change that affected students at the lower
end of the schooling distribution and did not lead students to acquire additional qualiﬁcations
given the school system in place. Further, our results add further evidence to a number of
recent studies that have found no effect from this policy change on socio-economic outcomes
that are considered to be correlated with earnings.
177 Appendix
7.1 MCMC Algorithm for Prior-Posterior Analysis
We simulate the joint posterior distribution for the augmented parameter space µ;s00;s11;¸






























































where µ = f¯;¾2;pg and the sub-samples Ilj of individuals are deﬁned as Ijk = fi : zi =
l and xi = jg. By introducing the latent type variables s00 and s11 and the scale parameters ¸
the posterior distribution can be estimated by a Gibbs algorithm based the conditional distribu-
tions of the parameters. The unobserved types s00 and s11 can be sampled directly from their
conditional posterior distributions, as in Chib and Jacobi (2008). For example, for a subject
i 2 I00, who can either be a complier or always drop-out 14,










C0) + pAD14 tº(yijw0
i¯AD14;¾2
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Similarly, for a subject i 2 I11, who can be of type always drop-out 15 or complier,






C1) + pAD15 tº(yijw0
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Based on the above observations, our MCMC algorithm is deﬁned as follows.
181. Sample(s00;s11jy;x;¯;¾2)bysamplingsi fori 2 I00 withPr(si = cjyi;xi;¯0c;¯0n;¾2
0c;¾2
0n)
and si for i 2 I11 with Pr(si = cjyi;xi;¯1c;¯1a;¾2
1c;¾2
1a)











3. Sample pjs00;s11 from the Dirichlet density ¼(pjs00;s11) = Dir(®C;®AD14;®AD15)
where ®k = ak;0 +
Pn
i=1 I[si = k] with k = C;AD14;AD15























where nkj denotes the number of individuals in the set Ikj
5. Sample ¾2















The algorithm updates the regression parameters ¯kj and the variance parameters ¾2
kj con-
ditional on the subject types s = fsi : i · ng and the sub-samples of individuals i 2 Ijk
where Ijk = fi : xi = jandsi = kg from normal and inverse gamma distributions respec-
tively. The scale parameters ¸ can be directly sampled from gamma distributions conditional
on the types and the other parameters and the type probabilities are drawn from Dirichlet dis-
tributions conditional on the type updates. The above steps are repeated a large number of
times. After the ﬁrst 1000 burn-in draws, the subsequent 10,000 draws are used to derive the
posterior quantities of interest.
7.2 Prior Speciﬁcation
To help specify suitable parameters for the prior distribution (equation 3.5) for the empirical
analysis we ﬁt the model to the an auxiliary sample of 2,518 males that turned 14 in 1944-
1945 or 1949-1950 period using ﬂexible and uninformed priors: the means for the normal
19priors of the regression coefﬁcients are set at zero and standard deviations at 5; the prior
means in the inverse gamma distributions for the variance parameters are ﬁxed at 0.5 and the
standard deviations at 1; the parameters of the Dirichlet prior for the type probabilities are set
to 50, 30 and 20. The posterior distributions of the model parameters for the various model
speciﬁcations for earnings and wages based on the auxiliary sample are obtained using the
algorithm described in the previous section. For the analysis of the main sample the prior
means of the regression coefﬁcients and the variances are set to the corresponding estimated
posterior means. The prior standard deviations are set at ﬁve times the values of estimated
posterior standard deviations. The values of the Dirichlet priors are according the estimated
posterior means obtained from the analysis of the auxiliary data set. Following this approach
the values for the prior means and standard deviations from the two models with 5 degrees of
freedom are set at the values shown in Table 5:
Prior Distribution Parameter Values
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
C0 C1 AD14 AD15 C0 C1 AD14 AD15
Log Weekly Earnings
¯kj;0=B0:5
kj;0 3.479/1.674 4.591/1.373 4.720/3.872 3.191/4.689 4.198/2.275 4.923/2.062 5.741/5.230 5.854/8.411
0.024/0.020 0.012/0.016 0.009/0.046 0.029/0.057 0.015/0.028 0.007/0.025 -0.003/0.064 -0.004/0.104
0.078/0.192 0.115/0.174 0.171/0.556 0.220/0.511
ºkj;0=±kj;0 0.092/0.033 0.094/0.033 0.167/0.131 0.125/0.091 0.091/0.032 0.091/0.035 0.168/0.128 0.130/0.100
®k;0 0.747 0.107 0.146 0.746 0.107 0.147
Log Hourly Wages
¯kj;0=B0:5
kj;0 -0.371/1.732 0.887/1.325 1.206/4.186 -0.687/4.189 0.421/2.341 1.293/1.835 2.373/5.525 1.170/6.699
0.026/0.021 0.012/0.016 0.007/0.049 0.031/0.051 0.016/0.029 0.006/0.023 -0.008/0.067 0.008/0.083
0.086/0.200 0.102/0.179 0.195/0.571 0.195/0.474
ºkj;0=±kj;0 0.099/0.036 0.099/0.034 0.189/0.144 0.135/0.096 0.099/0.035 0.098/.488 0.185/0.926 0.138/0.689
®k;0 0.747 0.107 0.146 0.747 0.107 0.146
Table 5: Parameter values for prior distribution used in the estimation of the model with student-t
errors with 5 degrees of freedom.
207.3 Marginal Likelihood Estimation
We compute the marginal likelihood for the model comparison via Bayes factors marginalized





where µ¤ refers to the vector of the posterior means of the parameters. The ﬁrst expression
of the likelihood can be evaluated directly at the posterior means of the parameters using the
expression ... from the previous section. The second expressions ¼(µ¤), the prior distribution
























































using the draws on ¸i’s and ¯kj from the main run of the MCMC algorithm. The ﬁrst reduced
run of the MCMC ﬁtting algorithm with ¾2
kj ﬁxed at ¾2¤












































I[si = c];®ad0;0 +
n X
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using a second reduced run of the MCMC algorithm with ¾2
kj ﬁxed at ¾2¤
kj and ¯kj ﬁxed at ¯¤
kj.
217.4 Appendix: Additional Results
Model Comparison
Log Marginal Likelihoods
dof /spec. 5/1 5/2 10/1 10/2 20/1 20/1 1/1 1/2
Earn -2029.13 -2023.80* -2049.93 -2054.71 -2071.13 -2067.62 -2095.32 -2096.73
Wage -2090.95 -2089.27* -2091.59 -2098.80 -2107.75 -2107.31 -2121.77 -2125.24
Table6: Estimatedlogmarginallikelihoodsforvariousdegreesoffreedomandcovariatespeciﬁcations
(* Model preferred based on marginal likelihood criterion) using uninformed prior. Results are based
on the draws from the MCMC sampler with 10,000 iterations and 1000 burn-in iterations.
Estimates of Average Returns to Schooling
CATE: Mean and Stand.Dev.
D.o.F 5 10 20 1
Earnings S1 -0.013 (0.045) 0.009 (0.035) 0.011 (0.028) 0.021 (0.010)
S2 -0.004 (0.043) 0.011 (0.033) 0.011 (0.027) 0.018 (0.022)
Wages S1 -0.037 (0.049) -0.010 (0.037) -0.004 (0.034) 0.000 (0.027)
S2 -0.027 (0.047) -0.009 (0.036) -0.004 (0.034) 0.000 (0.027)
Table 7: Posterior means and standard deviations for complier average treatment effect based on the
ﬁttings of the various model speciﬁcations with uninformed priors.
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